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Maximum Hours Legislation and Female Employment in the 1920s:
A Reassessment
ABSTRACT
The causes and consequences of state maximum hours laws for
female workers, passed from the mid—1800s to the 1920s, are explored
and are found to differ from a recent reinterpretation. Although maximum
hours legislation reduced scheduled hours in 1920, the impact was
minimal and it operated equally for men. Legislation affecting only
women was symptomatic of a general desire by labor for lower hours,
and these lower hours were achieved in the tight, and otherwise
special, World War I labor market —hoursof work declined substantially
for most workers in the second decade of this century. Most importantly,
the restrictiveness of the legislation had no effect on the employment
share of women in manufacturing. The legislation was, on the contrary,
associated with a positive impact on the employment share of women in
sales (another covered sector). Finally, labor force participation rates
of women across cities during the 1920s were strongly and negatively
correlated with shorter hours of work per day, consistent with one
time—series explanation for the increase in female market work.
These results are consistent with a labor market model in which
scheduled hours of work per day are negatively related to days worked
per week, and that assumption is justified using previously untapped






Philadelphia, PA 19104The development of ... statelegislation on hours has tended to
follow a very definite pattern. An insistent and persistent demand
for general legislation to insure shorter hours for all led to the
passage of general eight—hour laws. When statutes of such unrestricted
application proved unavailing, attempts at hours regulation concentrated
on specific classes of employees (Cahill 1968, orig. 1932, p. 94).
State laws mandating daily and weekly maximum hours of work appeared as
early as 1847 and by 1921 all but four states passed such legislation. Half
the states adopted their first laws during the initial two decades of this
century, and 40 states passed some form of hours legislation during the second
decade. While the precise number of hours and the details varied by state, one
aspect was common to all ——thelaws applied almost exclusively to the employment
of women.1 At the time of their passage they received mixed reviews. To their
champions the laws would serve to protect women from their employers however others
predicted they would result in reduced female employment.
The motivation for and impact of protective legislation have received renewed
attention. In her study of maximum hours legislation Elisabeth Landes (1980)
concluded that it greatly reduced hours worked per week by women in 1920 and
lessened their employment share in manufacturing, the major covered sector.
Furthermore, the reduction in employment was most pronounced among the daughters
of the foreign born, and the passage of this legislation was, by inference,
supported by native—born, male manufacturing workers, who stood the most to gain.
This paper reassesses the interpretation of maximum hours legislation and
introduces new information on its impact.The findings differ substantially
with those of Landes. Although maximum hours legislation reduced scheduled
hours, the impact was minimal and it operated equally for men. The reasons for
this apparently curious result are clear from the headnote. Legislation affecting
only women was symptomatic of a general desire by labor for lower hours, and
12
these lower hours were achieved in the tight, and otherwise special, World War
I labor market. It is important at the outset to point out that states that
passed legislation did not always have lower scheduled hours; there is no
relationship between scheduled hours of work by state in 1909 and subsequent
legislation. 2
Most importantly, the restrictiveness of the legislation had no effect on
the employment share of women in manufacturing. The legislation was, on the
contrary, associated with a positive impact on the employment share of women in
sales (another covered sector). Finally, higher labor force participation of
women across cities during the 1920s was strongly correlated with shorter hours
of work per day, consistent with one time—series explanation for the increase
in female market work. A by—product of this endeavor has been the collection
of information on the relationships among actual hours, scheduled hours, and
days worked for women. The evidence indicates that shorter scheduled hours per
day were associated with more days worked per week. More days worked per week
were translated, by way of the U.S. Population Census question on gainful
employment, into greater labor force participation rates.
Some of the differences between my findings and those of Landes are rooted
in misspecifications in the original article, while some are founded in new evidence
on hours of work. None of the differences between this paper and the Landes
article detracts from the contribution of the original, which was to highlight
an important and almost forgotten part of the history of hours of work, female
employment, and protective legislation.
The resolution of the impact of hours legislation is particularly relevant
with the recent passage of comparable worth legislation and with renewed interest
in the political economy of "rent seeking" behavior. Various types of protective3
legislation, such as child labor laws, compulsory attendance, and pay equity,
which were once viewed as humanitarian in origin, have also been reinterpreted
as directly benefiting certain groups ——butnot the ones to which the legislation
directly applied.
Maximum hours legislation may be relevant, as well, to understanding the
long—term decline in hours of work over the course of this century. The findings
of this paper regarding the relationship between the decline in male and female
hours necessitate further study of the decline in hours in general. Theaverage
scheduled work week in manufacturing fell by almost 9 hours from 1900 to 1920,
or by one full work day. Much of the decline occurred in the brief period from
1916 to 1920 (Historical Statistics 1975, Series D 769,p. 168) during and just
after an outpouring of state hours legislation (38 important laws were passed
from 1911 to 1919) and coinciding with generally favorable economic conditions
and trade union strength (1920 was the year of maximum membership). The roles
of World War I legislation, such as that affecting the railroads, and special
product demand, such as in lumber, complicate the general decline in hours but
not the relationship between it and protective legislation.
I. The Impact of Maximum Hours Legislation on Hours of Work
Did maximum hours legislation have an impact on the scheduled hours of
women and, if so, by how much? Landes (1980) explored this question with
state—level data from the 1919 U.S. Census of Manufacturing, which aggregated
male and female employees and gave scheduled (not actual) hours of workper
week.
To separate the impact of hours legislation on male and female employees
an identity is estimated in which mean scheduled hours by state are regressed
on the female share of employment in manufacturing (PMFF2O), a dummy variable4
equal to one if the state passed a maximum—hours law by 1914 interacted with
the percentage female (PMFF2O *DUM),and several variables (South dummy,
urbanization) to account for differences in hours across states. By including
only PMFF2O *DUM,the maximum—hours law dummy multiplied by percentage female,
the impact of hours laws is constrained to fall entirely on female employees.
The coefficient on PMFFZO *DUMis then the decrease in the number of hours
worked by women in states with hours legislation.4
A more general specification would also include the dummy variable (DUM),
the coefficient of which is the decrease in the number of hours worked by men
in states with hours legislation.The coefficient on PMFF2O *DUMis the
difference in the decline in hours (due to legislation) of women compared with
men, and that on the percent female (PMFF2O) is the difference between average
hours for females and males in the unconstrained states. The constant term is
the unconstrained value of male hours.5
Various hours equations estimated across states (and the District of
Columbia) are presented in Table 1.Column 1 gives the results in Landes
(1980); column 2 reestimates the same equation following the variable construction
in the original article and results in similar coefficients. The equation in
column 5 is identical to that in 2 but weights the observations by the square
root of the number of manufacturing employees in each state.Column 3 omits
the interaction of the dummy variable with the percentage of manufacturing
labor that was female but includes the dummy variable.Finally, column 4
contains the least constrained estimation.
Landes' estimation of the more restrictive equation indicated that hours
legislation decreased scheduled hours of women by 8 per week.Note that 8
hours per week was 15 percent of mean scheduled hours per week —almostone13
general, on the relationship between (Cf + 1) and ——essentiallya battle
between the usual labor supply elasticity and the less conventional elasticity
of days with respect to hours per day.
The elasticity of interest, that pertaining to female employment, can be
negative or positive even under the parameter restrictions in the Landes
formulation.22 Furthermore, the sign is independent of the signs of the other
elasticities.Female employment can increase with either an increase or a
decrease in the wage.The increase in female employment with a decrease in
hours now operates through two effects and is therefore easier to achieve with
given parameter values.It operates first through the initial increase in
wages as hours decline and secondly through the (negative) elasticity of labor
with respect to hours (_)23 Note that the data on scheduled hours and days
worked in Table 2 can be used to estimate the parameter ,whichis about —1
indicating that actual hours worked per week were relatively constant.24
The possibility that maximum hours laws could have expanded female employment
should not be surprising.It has been frequently asserted that female labor
force participation rates rose over the long run because scheduled hours of
work per day declined, enabling women with responsibilities at home to work
more days.25
In the employment equation estimated by Landes, the dependent variable was
the percentage of the total manufacturing labor force that was female in 1920 and
the key independent variable accounted for the degree of restrictiveness of the
state's maximum hours legislation.2' Other variables were included to account
for differences in the demand for or supply of female workers, such as urbanization,
region, and a lagged employment share in manufacturing capturing a host of
relevant factors.6
hours legislation (once again, that cover only women) was virtually identical
to that from the full estimation in Table 1.
These findings suggest that protective legislation for women was associated
with a decline in hours of work for men. The reason for this apparently peculiar
result is, as suggested by the headnote, that laborers in states that passed
protective legislation for women had sentiments for decreased hours of work in
general. They were able to lobby more forcefully for laws covering women whose
plight appealed to legislators, and state supreme courts did not, in general,
challenge those laws.Note that this analysis does not assess whether women
were "hours constrained" in the presence of legislation or whether men and
women were hours constrained prior to the large declines in hours from 1909 to
1919. Those are separate and difficult issues.
The proposition that protective legislation was passed in states in which
male labor lobbied vigorously for general hours reductions can be tested by
using disaggregated data by industry for 1914 and 1919 from the 1920 Manufacturing
Census.In each state the two major female—intensive industries and the two
major male—intensive industries were selected. In the former, females were, on
average, about 50% of the labor force; in the latter, however, they were less
than 2% of the labor force. The male—intensive industries therefore could not
have viewed increases female labor as a direct threat; these industries (lumber,
foundries, steam car railroads) never contained many female employees (if any
at all).
Define MDIFF to be average scheduled hours for males in 1919 minus average
scheduled hours for males in 1914 and FDIFF to be the same for females. Let
LIM14 be the existing weekly hours limit in 1914 (with the zero limit set equal
to 66 hours). Then,7
MDIFF =—20.75+0.268LIM14 +1.35SD +0.0320PURB
(5.67)(3.12) (1.54) (1.47) R2 =0.232
is obtained when estimated across the 49 states (plus D.C.) andindicates that
the 1914 hours limit is positively related to the decline in hours formales from
1914 to 1919. However,
FDIFF =2.80—0.072LIM14 +0.022SD —0.0493P1IRB
(0.53)(0.90) (0.03) (2.44) R2 =0.139
indicates that the decline in female hours was not related to theexisting 1914
limit.These results, taken together, suggest that labor in male—intensive
industries lobbied effectively for female hours limits in states in whichthey
were ultimately successful at lowering their own hours. Inmany of these states
the dominant male—intensive industry was lumber, in which the Wobbliesled
successful strike activity in the unique World War I environment (seeHidy, et
al. 1963, pp. 332—51). Organized labor in male—intensive industriescared about
female hours of work probably because the more laborersworking shorter hours,
the more it becomes the norm for all. Labor was successful inobtaining shorter
hours in the special 1914 to 1919 period.10
A further problem with the assertion that hourslegislation substantially
reduced hours of work is that the data analyzed are for scheduled, notactual,
hours. It is actual hours worked that are at issue. Dataon actual hours are
unavailable on a national basis for this period of time, but exist for 17
states in various surveys of the Women's Bureau. These states arenot, however,
a random sample; the Women's Bureau directed its efforts at states withhigher
than average scheduled hours.11 Even with this bias to thesample, the unweighted
mean of scheduled hours is 51.2 or exactly 1 hour below the unweighted mean of
scheduled hours in the 1919 Census of Manufacturers, which is theaverage for
males and females.'38
Scheduled weekly hours, actual weekly hours, the hours laws in effect at
the time of the survey, and days worked per week are given in Table 2 for the
various states included in the Women's Bureau bulletins. The data show that
mean actual hours were far more similar across states than were mean scheduled
hours. While it is true that states with the least restrictive hours legislation
had the highest scheduled hours per week, actual hours per week worked by
female employees in manufacturing and mercantile establishments were far less
than were average scheduled hours. In Missouri and South Carolina which had
among the highest scheduled hours, actual weekly hours worked were only 82
percent of scheduled hours. In Illinois, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, which
had among the lowest scheduled hours, the ratio was over 90 percent.The
elasticity of actual hours with respect to scheduled hours was 0.82.13
Row did employees manage to work fewer than the scheduled number of hours?
Female workers achieved fewer hours by working fewer days per week, not by working
fewer hours per day.14 Thus the difference between actual and scheduled hours
per week is found in the number of days worked, not the number of hours worked
in a day. Thus hours worked per day can be appropriately proxied by scheduled
daily hours, but the same is not true of hours worked per week. This finding
will be of particular relevance in exploring the impact of scheduled daily
hours on the employment of women.
The claim that hours worked per day varied less than did days worked per
week is supported in these data by various types of evidence. One is the
relationship between average days worked and average actual hours worked per week.
The data on days worked come from employees whose time was reported in days and
the data on hours per week come from employees whose time was reported in
hours.15 Thus the two data series are derived from different individuals. The9
question is whether the individuals who reported their time in days actually
worked full days. (The data necessary to do this exercise are not given in
Table 2.)Multiplying the number of days they claim •to have worked by the
average number of scheduled (not actual) hours in a day, will give the average
number of hours worked, if individuals varied days and not hours per day. The
fact that this number is very close to that obtained by a different group of
individuals, those reporting time in hours per week (column 2), indicates that
both groups probably varied days and not hours per day."
The close resemblance of the hours equation in Table 1 to that in the
original article indicates that the variables used are nearly identical. Thus
the next stage of the empirical work, that on employment, using an almost
identical set of variables should produce similar results. That, however, is
not the case.
II. The Impact on Employment: Theoretical Underpinnings and Empirical Results
The impact of maximum hours legislation on the employment of women in the
covered sector provided the key result in the Landes article. The estimation
was motivated by a model of a labor market which predicted, under the most
reasonable parameter values, that the female share of the covered sector would
decline with effective maximum hours legislation.
Landes posits a model of labor hours in which individuals choose hours of
work (h)1 say per week, as a function of their hourly wage (w):
eh i =w
and then choose to supply their labor (L1), say in laborers per week, as a function
of their weekly earnings (wh1):
aLl
L1 =(whj)10
where i =male(m), female (f) workers. Workers are perfect substitutes for
each other, and thus the wage is the same for both groups.Total hours of
labor services, S =h1L1,are identical, in equilibrium, to firm demand:
D =
Effectivemaximum hours legislation for females alters the equilibrium in two
manners: the elasticity of female hours with respect to the wage hf automatically
becomes 0 and hours of work for females are reduced if the constraint is binding.
The effects of the reduction in female hours on the total supply of hours, the
wage, female labor, and male labor are given by: dS/dhf > 0; dw/dhf < 0; dL./dhf
< 0; dh./dhf < 0; and dLf/dhf 0.
Thus all effects are unambiguous in sign except for that on female labor which
is the derivative of interest.It depends on the relationship between the
elasticity of demand for labor hours plus an elasticity weighted male labor
force share, and the female labor force share, (i+€'mSm —Sf)0.17 As
Landes points out, the most reasonable parameter estimates yield a positive
impact. The female labor force in the covered sector would decline with effective
maximum hours legislation.
This result is tested (and affirmed) in the Landes article by estimating the
impact on the female share of the manufacturing labor force of hours legislation.
Although the empirical results obtained by Landes are consistent with the
predictions of this model, I will demonstrate that they are in error.The
corrected results can be better explained by a slight revision of the model,
which is, as well, consistent with the data in Table 2 on actual hours of work.
Those data indicate that hours of work per week varied by the number of days worked
and not by the number of hours worked in a day. That is, hours per day were not
a choice variable to individuals, at least not at a point in time. The difference11
is one of major importance because maximum hours legislationfrequently mandated
both maximum hours per day and per week. If the only intent of thelegislation
was to constrain the number of hours women worked, only hoursper week would
have been necessary.
The evidence suggests that the number of hours workedper day is given to
the worker and the worker decides on the number ofdays. While the number of
hours per day varies by firm and by industry, it varies far less thandoes the
total number of actual hours worked per week. Assume, therefore, thathours
per day are the same across all firms." Tastes for work at each prevailing
wage—hours point will vary across individuals; some will not desire to work at
all when the work day is 10 hours, while some will workonly a few days a week.
A shorter work day will lead a greaterpercentage to enter the labor force and
will lead those in the labor force to work more daysper week.1'
Assume that the negative relationship between days worked andminimum
hours per day exists for women but not for men ——areasonable assumption given
the aggregate labor force participation rates of the twogroups. Therefore the
supply of female labor is given by:1°
— Cf
Lf=hf(whf)
while that for men is given by:
Cm
Lm=(wb)
where h =thegiven number of hours per day, L. =daysof labor supplied per
time period, w =thewage, f =female,and m male. The demand for hours of
labor is assumed identical to that in the original model (D =w).Note that
in this model, as in the original, firms treat hours of workas fungible across12
laborers ——twosix—hour shifts are equivalent to one 12—hour shift. The absence
of extreme substitutability would reduce employment of the constrained group.
The new version of the model is distinguished from the old because minimum
hours of work per day demanded by employers affects the number of days worked
by females. To obtain this result I assume that hours worked per day is not a
choice variable.21 There are now three effects generated by a mandated decline
in hours of work per day, rather than two. The two in the original model are
that days worked decreases because the reduction in hours reduces earnings, but
days worked increases because the wage rate increases. A third effect, serving
to increase the supply of labor, is added through the negative relationship
between minimum hours per day and days worked per time period.
The four elasticities of interest are those concerning total labor hours
(S). female labor (Lf) the wage (w), and male labor (Lm)s and they are given
by:
(hf/S)(dS/dhf) =nsf(ef




as (Cf —) +(Cf (t + SmCf Sf)/1)
0
(hf/w)(dw/dhf) =—sf(Cf
—+1)/a0 as Cf —+10
(hf/L)(dL/dhf) =—8Sf(Cf —+1)/a 0 as C —+10
where a =( +s8 + Smem) and =(L1h1IS),the female or male share of
total labor hours. In the original model, maximum hours legislation for women
reduced their equilibrium hours and increased the equilibrium wage rate. Thus
the impact on female labor was ambiguous because earnings declined through hours
but increased through wages. The impact on male labor was unambiguously positive,
operating only through wages.All effects are now ambiguous and depend, in13
general, on the relationship between (Cf + 1) and ——essentiallya battle
between the usual labor supply elasticity and the less conventional elasticity
of days with respect to hours per day.
The elasticity of interest, that pertaining to female employment, can be
negative or positive even under the parameter restrictions in the Landes
formulation.22 Furthermore, the sign is independent of the signs of the other
elasticities.Female employment can increase with either an increase or a
decrease in the wage.The increase in female employment with a decrease in
hours now operates through two effects and is therefore easier to achieve with
given parameter values.It operates first through the initial increase in
wages as hours decline and secondly through the (negative) elasticity of labor
with respect to hours (_)23 Note that the data on scheduled hours and days
worked in Table 2 can be used to estimate the parameter ,whichis about —1
indicating that actual hours worked per week were relatively constant.24
The possibility that maximum hours laws could have expanded female employment
should not be surprising.It has been frequently asserted that female labor
force participation rates rose over the long run because scheduled hours of
work per day declined, enabling women with responsibilities at home to work
more days.25
In the employment equation estimated by Landes, the dependent variable was
the percentage of the total manufacturing labor force that was female in 1920 and
the key independent variable accounted for the degree of restrictiveness of the
state's maximum hours legislation.2' Other variables were included to account
for differences in the demand for or supply of female workers, such as urbanization,
region, and a lagged employment share in manufacturing capturing a host of
relevant factors.14
The restrictiveness variable (REST) measures the percentage of the state's
nianufacturing labor force in 1909 that worked (in actuality, the percentage
working in establishments that had scheduled hours) over the legal maximum in
effect in 1914. Note that the restrictiveness variable is a highly appropriate
variable for this exercise and is considerably better than a simple dummy
variable indicating whether or not a state passed an hours law from 1905 to
1914. The REST variable accounts for prior conditions and gives the proportion
of the labor force in 1909 that would be constrained by the hours legislation
passed by 1914. Landes' estimated regression, given in column (3) of Table 3,
indicates that states with more restrictive legislation had a lower female
employment share in manufacturing. Further estimations by Landes indicate that
most of the decline in the employment share occurred for the daughters of the
foreign born and for foreign born women. These results provided persuasive
evidence that hours legislation was passed under the guise of humanitarian
concern through the efforts of labor groups and others that stood the most to
gain from restricting the employment of immigrant women and their daughters.
Note, however, the other regressions for the manufacturing sector appearing
in Table 3.These were estimated on identical variables by state, most of
which were also in the Table 1 estimation. Unlike those in Table 1, there is
little relationship between my results and those of Landes. Most importantly,
the coefficient on REST is insignificant and that on the hours legislation dummy
variable is significant only at unconventional levels.27 These results are
robust to restricting the sample to the 40 states (and District of Columbia)
that are highlighted in the original article (that is, excluding 8 mountain
states having few manufacturing workers), to weighting the regression by the
square root of manufacturing employment in the state (not included in the15
table), and to estimating a (weighted) logistic transformation of the dependent
variable (also not in the table).'
The source of the difference is in a computational error in the original
estimation. States that had the most restrictive legislation passed both daily
and weekly hours laws. The REST variable in the original article was inadvertently
computed using a weekly restriction that was always 6 times the daily restriction.
That procedure resulted in the correct weekly restriction in many of the cases,
but 11 states (or one—quarter of the sample) had more restrictive weekly hours.
Focus now on a different equation in Table 3, one in which the dependent
variable is the percentage of sales (not clerical) labor force that is female
in 1920 (PSF2O), as in column (4). Retail trade was also covered by maximum
hours legislation and in many states mercantile establishments were covered
before manufacturing firms. An equation similar to that for the manufacturing
sector is estimated for the sales sector with results that are very different.
Rather than declining, as in the original article, and rather than being
insignificant, as was the case for the manufacturing equation estimated in this
paper, the female share of sales employment actually increased in states having
more restrictive hours legislation.2' It should be emphasized that the decline
in the female share of the manufacturing labor force during the 1900 to 1920
period did not mark a new trend. The female share of the manufacturing labor
force had been declining for decades preceding maximum hours legislation, and
the share probably peaked as early as the 1840s (see Goldin and Sokoloff,
1982). Female employment in the sales sector, however, began to increase
during the first decades of this century.The coefficient on REST in this
equation suggests that maximum hours legislation, by reducing daily hours in
this sector, increased the employment share of females.Thus maximum hours16
legislation may have had little or no effect on female employment in manufacturing
and a positive effect on female employment in sales.The possibility that
there was a differential effect of hours legislation on these two sectors
should not be disturbing. The framework outlined earlier suggested that certain
parameters would determine the sign of the effect, in particular s which was
higher in sales, and it is possible that other parameters differed by sector.
The variables used thus far to measure the employment effect are the shares
of women in a particular sector.The female labor force participation rate
could also have been altered by hours legislation because, under the gainful
worker definition, participation is related to the average number of days an
individual works (see Goldin, forthcoming).To assess this proposition a
relationship was estimated across large urban areas (cities having over 100,000
persons) in various states between the labor force participation rate of a
group of women, for example native—born white married women, and mean scheduled
hours of work in manufacturing.
Constant elasticity equations were estimated for white women of native—born,
foreign—born, and native—born of foreign—born parents, separately for married
and all marital statuses. The coefficients on hours per day in all equations
were negative, indicating that shorter hours were associated with higher
participation rates. The result holds across all subgroups of white women, but
it is strongest, by nativity, for married women (except for the foreign born).30
The generally larger elasticities for married women indicate that days worked
per year were more responsive to scheduled hours per day for those with greater
home responsibilities.
How important is the effect of hours on days worked and thus on labor
force participation rates? The mean labor force participation rate of married17
native—born white women living in large urban areas in 1920 was 10.6 percent
and mean scheduled hours per week were 51.5.Meanscheduled hours per week
fell to about 44 by 1940 and the labor force participation rate of white married
women in large urban areas rose to about 18 percent.31 The increase in the
participation rate predicted by the decrease in hours worked is 3.6 percentage
points or almost half the difference in the actual change.
III. Summary Comments
The causes and consequences of maximum hours legislation have been explored
and found to differ from the reinterpretation presented by Landes (1980).In
particular, hours declined for men as well as for women in states with hours
legislation and the employment share of women in manufacturing did not decrease
with the restrictiveness of the legislation. Indeed, the employment share of
women in another covered sector, sales, rose with increasing restrictiveness
and female labor force participation rates were positively correlated with
shorter hours.82
These findings are ezplained within the context of a model similar to that
in Landes (1980) but in which scheduled daily hours is a binding constraint on
the worker.Workers with home responsibilities choose fewer days when face
with higher daily hours. Thus lower daily hours, within some limits, increase
days worked. The negative relationship between scheduled hours and days worked
is explored with previously unused data sources.
This work has raised further questions about hours legislation and the
long—term decline in the work day and week in America.I have suggested the
reasons for the relationship between the decline in hours worked by men and
legislation protecting women, but it is still not clear what precise mechanisms
operated to reduce hours of work for all.18
Table 1
The Impact of flours Legislation on Scheduled Weekly flours by State, 1920
Dependent Variable IIRS19 =meanscheduled hours in
manufacturing in 1919 (unweighted mean =52.2;weighted mean
=51.7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Independent Landes Weighteda
Variables
Constant 53.3 53.4 54.4 54.8 53.6
(69.1) (80.7) (88.1) (56.2) (69.3)
SD 1.72 1.34 1.47 1.51 0.85
(3.43) (2.27) (2.57) (2.60) (1.24)
PURB —0.05 —0.058 —0.056 —0.058 —0.067
(3.72) (3.72) (3.85) (3.83) (3.52)
PMFF2O 0.11 0.142 0.067 0.030 0.158
(1.93) (2.36) (1.35) (0.36) (2.61)
PMFF2O *DLJM —0.08 —0.105 0.055 —0.088
(1.81) (2.04) (0.56) (1.66)
DUM —1.61 —2.162
(2.77) (1.87)
R2 67. 61.3 63.4 64.2 65.2
Number of
Observations 49 49 49 49 49
Notes: SD =dummyvariable for southern states
PURB =percentageof state's population that was urban in 1910
PMFF2O =percentageof manufacturing labor force that was female
DUM =1if state passed its first maximum hours law by 1914
The means of the (unweighted) independent variables are:
SD =0.31;PURB =41.0;PMFF2O =12.3;DUM0.694
Absolute values of 't' statistics are in parentheses.
a The weight is the square root of the manufacturing labor force in each state.
Note that none of the equations has been weighted to account for heteroscedasticity
in estimating an identity, however see text for a justification.
Sources: Column (1): Landes (1980, p. 480). Columns (2), (3), (4) and (5):
flours data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1928); PMFF2O, manufacturing
employment data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1923); D1JMfrominformation in
Landes (1980, table 1) and U.S. Women's Bureau (1931).Table 2
Mean Scheduled Hours, Actual Hours, and Days Worked by State, 1920s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State Scheduled Actual (2)1(1)Hours Law Actual Days
(survey Hours Hours in Effect Worked
date) Daily/Weekly
Alabama 53.9 46.4 86.1 none 5.24
(1924)
Arkansas 51.5 47.7 92.6 9/54 5.71
(1922)
Delaware 50.4 41.1 81,5 10/55 523
(1924)
Georgia 55.5 47.9 86.3 10160a 4.48
(1920)
Illinois 49.0 44.7 91.2 10/none n.a.
(1924)
Iowa n.a. 50.3 n.a. none n.a.
(1920)
[ansas 43.4 37.7 87.0 8/55 n.a.
(1920)
[entucky 51.7 45.0 87.0 10/60 n.a.
(1921)
Maryland 48.2 n.a. n.a. 10/60 n.a.
(1921)
Mississippi 55.6 49.8 89.6 10/none n.a.
(1925)
Missourib 53.1 43.5 89.5 9/54 5.42
(1922)
New Jersey 48.4 44.3 91.5 9/50 5.23
(1922)
Ohio 48.4 43.3 89.5 9/50 5.21
(1922)
Oklahoma 51.1 44.4 86.9 9/54 5.64
(1924)
Rhode Island 49.0 46.0 93.9 10/54 n.a.
(1920)
S. Carolina 54.6 44.9 82.2 lOISS/6O 4.48
(1921/22)
Tennessee 52.8 48.7 92.3 10.5/57 5.10
(1925)
Virginia n.a. 52.5 n.a. 10/none n.a.
(1919)
a Applies only to women working in cotton and woolen mills.
b Data for white women only.
c 55 hours applies to textile factories; 60 hours elsewhere.
Sources: U.S. Women's Bureau, (1919 to 1927).
1920
Table 3
The Effect of flours Legislation on the Employment Share of
Women in Manufacturing and Sales, 1920
Dependent Variables: Mean of PMFF2O =0123a;Mean of PSF2O =0.333
IndependentPMFF2O PMFF2O PMFF2O PSF2O
Variables (Landes)
(1) Means (2) (3) (4)
Constant —0.011 —0.023 —0.00168 0.149
(1.17) (1.73) (1.11) (6.14)
EMP_1 0.728 0.156 0.775 0.79 0.772
(10.6) (9.30) (9.66) (8.47)
SD 0.013 0.306 0.016 0.0005 —0.006
(1.34) (1.61) (0.06) (0.61)
PURB 0.0006 41.0 0.0005 0.0005 —0.0005
(2.59) (2.16) (2.26) (2.79)
DUM —0.01120.327 —0.0134 —0.0012 —0.0082
(1.34) (1.42) (0.14) (0.92)
REST —0.00050.324 0.0048 —0.0253 0.026
(0.04) (0.33) (1.49) (1.88)
R2 85.5 83.4 83. 79.4
Number of
Observations 49 41 41
Notes: PMFF2O =femaleemployment share of manufacturing in 1920; PSF2O =female
employment share in sales (salespersons and clerks in stores) in 1920; EMP1 =
Femaleemployment share of manufacturing (sales for col. 4) in 1900 (1910 for
sales); DUM =1if a maximum hours law was passed from 1905 to 1914; REST =
proportionof employees in 1909 who worked greater than the maximum number of
weekly hours in effect in 1914. Column (3) from Landes (1980, p. 484) divides
all coefficients by 100 (except EMP_1) because the numbers in Landes express
the share as a percentage rather than as a proportion. OLS estimation used for
consistency with Landes. A weighted logit transformation yields almost identical
slopes around the mean for the 49 states (and D.C.) and the nonmountain sample.
Sources: Column (3): Landes (1980, p. 484).Columns (1), (2), and (4): DUM
constructed from data in Landes (1980, table 1) and U.S. Women's Bureau (1931);
RESTconstructedfrom U.S. Bureau of the Census (1913) and U.S. Women's Bureau
(1931); EMP_1 from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1904) and (1914); PMFF2O and
PSF2O from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1923).
a The mean is given for the entire 48 states plus District of Columbia.
b The eight mountain states are excluded for consistency with the Landes estimation.21
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FOOThOTES
1. Mississippi (in 1910) and Oregon (in 1920) passed legislation covering men,
and the Georgia law covered all textile workers (see Cahill, 1968). Many other
states attempted to pass general legislation but were thwarted by various state
supreme courts, except when the laws explicitly allowed contracts for more than
the maximum number of hours ——renderingthem virtually useless.
2. The possibility that hours legislation was passed in states in which hours
had already declined, and therefore in which there was less opposition, is
reduced by the estimation in Landes (1980, p. 481) of an hours equation for
1909.States which passed hours legislation after 1909 did not have lower
average scheduled hours in 1909. It is conceivable, however, that actual hours
of work for men greatly exceeded scheduled hours because of overtime, but there
is no indication that overtime work was negatively related to the existence of
hours restrictions.
3. On child labor laws in Britain see Marvel (1977).Note that Landes and
Solmon (1972) interpret the passage of compulsory schooling legislation as
coming after most children were in school for the legislated amount of time.
Neither E. Landes nor I have been able to find convincing empirical evidence to
support the hypothesis for the case of hours (see footnote 7).
4. The identity is simply:
H =afHf+(1—af)L,+(af
*DUM)fBf
where H is average scheduled hours, R is average scheduled hours for females
in unconstrained states, Km is average scheduled hours for males in unconstrained
states, DUM is =1if a state has a maximum hours law, af is the percentage of
manufacturing employment that is female, and is the marginal impact of hours






Thus the coefficient on af is the difference in female and male hours in
unconstrained states and the coefficient on af *DUNis the decline in female
hours in constrained states.
5. The more general specification adds to that in footnote 3 a term for the










6. The percentage of the manufacturing labor force that was female was 12.3
(unweighted).Multiplying by the coefficient on PMFF2O *DUMfromcolumn 2
gives 1.29.
7. The weighted version of this equation yields a somewhat lower and less
significant coefficient on DUM.
8. As noted in the table, the equations are not corrected for possible
heteroscedasticity problems inherent in estimating identities.
9. The results for the foundry data (using the variable definitions and
constructions in Table 1) are, first for the unweighted sample and then for the
weighted sample:
HRS19 =54.7—0.052PURB —0.109SD —1.31DUM;= 35.5;N =44
(60.9) (3.11) (0.14) (1.54)
HRS19 =54.8—0.033PURB—0.336SD —1.84DUM; R2=30.9;N =44.
(56.3) (2.03) (0.40) (2.06)
Five states had insufficient employment in foundries to be listed in the census.
10. Note that there is no implication that female employees were unconstrained
in states with maximum hours legislation, although I have not been able to estimate
a decline in their hours (for the female—intensive industry sample) in states with
restrictions (an exercise similar to that in Table 1 of the paper). Male—intensive
industry hours, however, are lower by 1.5 in states with legislation, consistent
with the foundry data.
11. The Women's Bureau did include several states (such as New Jersey and Ohio)
which had restrictive hours legislation. These states had requested surveys to
assist in evaluating their legislation or formulating minimum wage standards.
12. One problem with making comparisons between the 1919 Census of Manufacturers
figure and that of the Women's Bureau Bulletins is that the latter span the
period 1919 to 1925.Beney (1936) and others (Historical Statistics, 1975)
find, however, that hours were relatively level during the 1920s and declined
sharply from about 1914 to 1920.
13. An equation estimated across the 15 states with complete information yields:
log Actual Hours =0.576+0.821log Scheduled Hours
(0.78) (4.40)
R2 =.598; =.57;t—statistics in parentheses
Source: Table 2
14. The difference between scheduled and actual hours is due to two sets of
factors: those affecting the firm, which are a constraint on the individual,
and those resulting from individual choices. It seems clear that states with a
high percentage of women working in cotton textile mills had shorter work weeks25
because of firm closings.
15. It is probably the case that the individuals who reported time in hourswere
primarily time workers and those who reported time in days were primarily
piece—rate workers. The bulletins are not clear on this distinction, but those
surveys that requested information on time and piece—rate work contain data
that are consistent with this interpretation.
16. The result for New Jersey, for example, is 45.2 hours compared with actual
hours of 44.3 per week. A second set of data (not given in the table) demonstrates
the same point. Information in the Women's Bureau bulletins indicates that the
majority of individuals who worked fewer than scheduled hours lost hours in
multiples of the modal daily scheduled hours (or modal Saturday hours) for the
state. That is, they did not lose, for example, 3 or 17 hours per week but 6
or 16 hours per week, when modal daily scheduled hours were 10 and modal Saturday
hours were 6. Such evidence creates a prima facie case that individuals varied
days and not hours.
17. The term Cm =€Lm+ + (CLm * Bhm).
18. The choice of hours per day by these firms will depend on the technology
used, in particular the degree of complementarity across types of labor and the
cost of idle capital. It will also depend on the distribution across individuals
of the cost to them of working.
19. This negative relationship between hours and days worked will only hold
within some range.Surely as the given number of hours per day of work gets
low enough, some individuals will not find it worth their while togo to work.
20. The notation in the model and the empirical work that follows is almost
identical to that in the Landes article.The only difference is that the
subscripts 1 and 2 are replaced here by f and m.
21. If hours per day were a choice variable, women could work fewer hoursper
day and not have to trade—off days per week and hours per day.
22. That is, if (Cf —)+(8f(t+ SmC—f)/I}( 0, which is needed for Lf to
increase with a decrease in hf1 then (Cf—3)+ 11 can be of either sign. The
only restriction that can be imposed is that +smem —Sf)> 0, as suggested
by Landes from historical evidence.
23. The precise difference is as follows. In the Landes model there is a positive
elasticity of male hours per day with respect to the wage rate,c, which is
zero in my model because hours per day are exogenous. The requirement in the
original model for dLf/dh < 0 is:
Cf(q+CmSm —Sf)+ CfSmC(1 + < 0
The requirement for dLf/dh < 0 in my model is:
8f(1+ 8m5m—Sf)+ 1(ef—)< 026
Thus it is clear that there are weaker restrictions in my model because of the
existence of the elasticity of female labor (in days) with respect to hours per
day (—a).
24.The equation is:
log Days =5.41—0.955log Scheduled Hours
(2.66) (1.85)
Number of observations =10;R2 =.301; =.213;t—statistics in parentheses
Source: Table 2
25. As John Durand noted (1948, p. 118), "The secular decrease in weekly hours
of work is perhaps almost as important as the change in occupational composition
of the demand for labor, as a factor in the increasing employment of women.
The length of the working week is especially important in connection with the
availability of married women for jobs."
26. Note that d(Lf/Lt)/dhf can be < 0 even when dLf/dhf > 0 in the original
formulation of the model. That possibility is less likely to occur in the new
version.
27. The dummy variable indicates the passage of the first hours law from 1905
to 1914 and is therefore a less reliable indicator of the level of hours
restrictions than is the REST variable.
28. Another set of key estimations in the original paper focused on the impact
of hours legislation on the employment share of native—born, foreign parentage
women and foreign—born women. The results of these estimations yielded larger
and more statistically significant coefficients than in the entire sample. My
attempt to replicate these results did not yield significant effects on the key
variable, REST. These equations have been estimated across the 41 (non—mountain)
states (and D.C.) highlighted in the original article.
Share of Native—White, Foreign—Parentage Women in Manufacturing Labor Force
=—0.0050 +0.692EMP1 —0.0007SD +0.0002P11B—0.0119 DIThI +0.0042REST
(0.92) (7.52) (0.14) (2.06) (2.55) (0.56)
R2 =87.2;N=41;Meanof dependent variable =0.036.
Share of Foreign—Born Women in Manufacturing Labor Force
=—0.0083+0.669EMP_1+0.0028SD +0.0003 PURB—0.0018DUM—0.0036REST
(3.12) (14.6) (1.07) (4.70) (0.68) (0.88)
=94.5;N=41;Meanof dependent variable = 0.020.
29. Note that the restrictiveness variable is computed for the manufacturing
labor force because scheduled hours for mercantile establishments are not
available.The Women's Bureau bulletins cited in Table 2 indicate, however,
that there was relatively homogeneity within states across manufacturing and27
sales hours schedules. Note, as well, that the estimation includes the percentage
of sales workers who were female in 1910 rather than the percentage in 1900, as
in the manufacturing estimations. While it would have been more appropriate to
use 1900, only 1910 data are available for sales workers.
30. The elasticities of labor force participation with respect to mean scheduled
hours of work per week in manufacturing for various nativity groups of married
and all women in 1920 are:
Elasticity t—statistic Elasticity t—statistic
Married All Marital Statuses
NN —2.32 (2.58) NN —1.24 (2.42)
NP —3.70 (3.93) NP —2.71 (4.07)
PB —2.33 (2.98) FB —2.45 (3.86)
where NN =native—born,native parentage; NP =native—born,foreign parentage;
FB =foreignborn.Source: Hill (1929). Equations were estimated across the
large urban areas of 31 states.
31. The figure for scheduled hours in 1940 is approximate; only data for actual
hours are readily available.
32. One finding that is not in dispute is the relationship between the passage
of maximum hours laws and union strength, which Landes found to be a prime
determinant of the restrictiveness of legislation as of 1914 (using the state's
unionization ranking in 1964). My interpretation of this result, however, is
that unions were less interested in restricting female employment than they were
in reducing hours in all industries, especially male—intensive ones such as
lumber and steel.